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Since such doubts still persist for many 
people, it is hoped that the study contained in 
this issue will clear them away, to some extent 
at any rate. 
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μα 
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m rem 
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MWe 
MWth 
BWR 
PWR 
FBR 
LWR 
HTGR 
LMFBR 
ICRP 
curie (3.7 x 10 disintegrations/s) 
megacurie ( 1 000 000 curies) 
millicurie (one thousandth of one curie) 
microcurie (one thousandth of one millicurie) 
picocurie (one millionth of one microcurie) 
unit of absorbed radiation dose (1 rad = 100 ergs per gram of irradiated 
substance) 
millirad (one thousandth of one rad) 
dose equivalent ("that dose of any radiation which, when delivered to 
man or mammal, is biologically equivalent to the dose of one rad of 
X­ or gamma radiation") 
millirem (one thousandth of one rem) 
the product of the dose and the number of persons affected 
Maximum Permissible Concentration 
megawatt, electrical (one million watt electrical) 
megawatt, thermal 
Boiling Water Reactor 
Pressurized Water Reactor 
Fast Breeder Reactor 
Light Water Reactor 
High Temperature Gas­cooled Reactor 
Liquid Metal­cooled Fast Breeder Reactor 
International Commission of Radiation Protection 
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I. FORECASTS 
OF NUCLEAR POWER 
The illustrative programme drawn up 
by the Commission of the European 
Communities (CEC) in 1972 set a target 
for nuclear power development and the 
related industry in the Community of six 
member states during the years to come. 
On the basis of this programme and 
the published figures for the new member 
states, the foreseeable development of 
nuclear power in the European Commu-
nity is summarized in Table I. 
A forecast of the growth of nuclear 
power in the Western world was publish-
ed by the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission (USAEC) in 1971 (WASH-
1139 Reactors; 77D-4500J. The data 
given in this forecast for the countries of 
the European Communities, the other 
European countries, the USA, Canada 
and Japan are summarized in Table II. 
Both forecasts relate to the medium-
term development (up to 1985) and 
largely arrive at the same conclusions. 
Discrepancies can be accounted for by 
differences in the scope of the fore-
casts and in the underlying assumption 
on which they were based. 
As far as the long-term forecast is 
concerned, the figures in Table III are 
for the original Community of six 
countries and the present Community of 
nine. 
The light water reactor (LWR) is the 
dominant reactor type in the United 
States accounting for almost 100% of all 
the nuclear energy produced. 
Within the six countries of the Com-
munity, half of the power plants in 
existence in 1972 were equipped with 
light water reactors and it was expected 
that L WRs would provide 75%, of total 
nuclear energy production by 1975. In 
the European Community of nine, gas-
cooled reactors outnumber light water 
reactors. It is, however, estimated that 
over a number of years the light water 
reactor will also become the dominant 
type. Other reactor types, e.g., fast 
breeders (FBR) and high temperature gas 
cooled reactors (HTGR), will start to 
make a significant contribution around 
1985. 
Attention here has been mainly devot-
ed to light water reactors. This should 
give a reasonable estimate of the pollu-
tion potential of nuclear power in normal 
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1975 
1980 
1985 
Installed nuclear capacity 
(thousands of MWe) 
Community 
of Six 
12 
45 
100 
Community 
of Nine 
23 
55 
140 
Table I: Foreseeable development of nuclear 
power in the European Community as from 
the illustrative programme drawn up in 1972 
and the published figures for the new member 
states. 
1990 
1995 
2000 
Installed nuclear capacity 
(thousands of MWe) 
Community 
of Six 
210 
380 
620 
Community 
of Nine 
315 
570 
930 
Table III: Long-term forecast of installed 
nuclear capacity (in thousands of MWe) for 
the original Community of six countries and 
the present Community of nine. 
Table II: Estimated cumulative capacity of nuclear power plants: Western Europe, USA, 
Canada, Japan (thousands of MWe). 
Belgium + Luxembourg 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom + Ireland 
Community of Nine 
Total 
Austria 
Finland 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Other West European 
countries 
Total 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
1970 
0.1 
— 
1.5 
0.8 
0.6 
0.1 
4.7 
7.8 
_ 
— 
— 
— 
0.6 
0.4 
0.4 
1.4 
5.0 
0.2 
0.2 
1975 
0.9 
— 
3.7 
5.9 
0.6 
0.5 
10.6 
22.2 
_ 
— 
— 
— 
1.0 
2.7 
2.0 
5.7 
59.0 
0.6 
5.1 
1980 
2.6 
0.8 
8.8 
15.6 
4.3 
2.3 
24.8 
59.2 
1.3 
1.0 
0.5 
0.3 
6.0 
7.9 
4.4 
21.4 
150.0 
7.8 
20.8 
1985 
4.2 
2.6 
16.9 
31.3 
9.6 
5.2 
48.3 
118.1 
2.0 
2.6 
1.6 
0.6 
13.7 
16.6 
7.5 
44.6 
299.0 
17.0 
49.0 
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(routine) operating conditions and in the 
event of accidents, it being borne in mind 
that gas-cooled reactors, heavy water 
reactors and fast breeders may be more 
attractive in some aspects and less in 
others. 
II. RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 
FROM A GROWING 
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 
A. Radioactive effluents produced during 
routine operation of nuclear power 
plants: radiation standards, current 
practice, medium- and long-term fore-
casts 
1. Radiation protection standards, e.g., 
Euratom Basic Standards 
The purpose of the Euratom radiation 
standards is to protect man against the 
somatic and genetic effects of exposure 
to ionizing radiation. They cover the 
following three categories of persons: 
a) persons professionally exposed, i.e., 
those who, by reason of the perfor-
mance of their professional duties, are 
exposed to ionizing radiation; 
b) members of the population, who may 
be more sensitive to the effects of 
ionizing radiation, such as children 
or pregnant women and persons living 
adjacent to nuclear installations (some-
times called population "at risk"), for 
whom the standards will therefore 
have to be stricter; 
c) the population at large7 , for whom 
the setting of standards is essentially 
determined by genetic considerations. 
These standards, which were drawn up 
and are periodically revised on the basis 
of the recommandations of the ¡CRP 
(International Commission for Radiol-
ogical Protection), are being used by the 
Member States of the Community in 
drawing up their own regulations. 
The radiation protection standards 
consist of basic standards, i.e., those 
specifying the maximum permissible 
levels of exposure and the principles 
governing their application. They also 
include derived limits, such as the 
maximum permissible concentrations 
/ The term "population at large" is taken here to 
mean the population as a whole i.e., the professionally 
exposed, the so-called population "at risk" (adjacent 
to nuclear installations) and the rest of the population. 
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(MPC) of radionuclides in the atmo­
sphere or in drinking water. 
2. Application of radiation protection 
standards in the generation of nuclear 
power—present experience of dis­
charges from power plants 
In applying these standards, a distinc­
tion must be made between those who 
are professionally exposed to radiation 
and the general public. 
Persons professionally exposed to radia­
tion: in the field of nuclear power 
generation, they are exposed both to 
radiation and contamination. 
Experience has shown that the internal 
contamination of personnel occurs only 
rarely in nuclear power stations. On the 
other hand, external radiation often gives 
rise to problems with regard to the 
observance of the radiation protection 
standards, especially in the case of 
inspection, maintenance and repair. This 
is mainly because provision for access to 
various components and for maintenance 
purposes is not always made at the design 
stage. 
It should be noted that, in order to 
eliminate these difficulties, the CEC has 
decided to have studies carried out of the 
measures which can be taken in nuclear 
power stations, both at the design stage 
and in practice, to reduce the extent to 
which maintenance and inspection staff 
are exposed to radiation. 
For the sake of comparison it should 
be pointed out here that in fuel processing 
plants the occupational exposure hazard 
may be considered to be somewhat 
higher, but the number of installations 
is and will remain much lower. 
The population living in the vicinity of 
nuclear power plants is subject to the 
hazard of exposure to the gaseous or 
liquid radioactive effluents discharged 
by them into the environment. 
A distinction must be made here 
between the effluents from nuclear power 
stations and those from nuclear fuel 
processing plants (dealt with in section 
II.Β below). 
The gaseous effluents from nuclear 
power stations, particularly water­cooled 
reactors, contain radioactive rare gases, 
mainly xenon­133 (Xe1 3 3) and krypton­
85 (Kr 8 5 ) , and sometimes also radioactive 
iodine and aerosols (particulates). 
Table IV: Comparative table of human exposure to radiado 
1. Mean annual dose­rates due to natural background radiation 
in "normal" areas 
!
gonads 93 mrad /year 
bone­lining cells 92 mrad /year 
bone­marrow 89 mrad /year 
However, dose­rates vary with the geology and with altitude. a) geology: igneous rocks 
b) altitude: 
at 3 000 m altitude 
transatlantic flight at 10 000 m 
2. Diagnostic X­ray doses in medicine 
genetically significant dose 
up to 5 000 mrad /year 
approx. 90 mrad /year 
3­5 mrad/flight 
6­60 mrem/year' 
3. Annual exposure due to gaseous effluent releases from nuclear power stations 
a) individuals at site boundary: 
PWR 
BWRl 
1 mrem/year 
5 mrem/year 
b) average exposure of individuals within a 5 km radius: 
PWR < 0.1 mrem/year 
BWR < l mrem/year 
c) average population exposure due to all nuclear powe 
applications ' } 1 mrem/year 
4. Maximum permissible doses and dose limits as laid down by Euratom standards 
(whole­body doses) 
persons professionally exposed 
members of the public (critical groups) 
population "at large" 
(genetically significant dose) 
5 000 mrem/year 
500 mrem/year 
5 rem in 30 years 3 
(170 mrem/year) 
J Values for E u r o p e ; in the Uni ted States abou t 100 mrem/year . 
2 F o r BWRs two calculated peaks of 170 and 31 mrem respectively, have been reported at the site 
boundary . 
3 Other , more severe values are recommended or laid d o w n : 
¡CRP 2 rem in 30 years 66 mrem/year 
ERG 1 , , „ 
, ­ t ­ e o f­ 2 rem in 30 years 
Sweden 1 rem in 30 years 
UK 1 rad in 30 vears 
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The liquid effluents may contain mixed 
fission products, corrosion products and 
tritium. 
Examination of the figures for routine 
discharges indicates that they can be 
broken roughly as follows: 
1. GASEOUS EFFLUENTS 
a) Noble and activation gases 
typical values for a BWR: range be-
tween 104 and 106 Ci/year (102-104 
Ci/MWe a year); 
typical values for a PWR: up to 104 
Ci/year (up to approx. 10 Ci/MWe a 
year). 
b) Aerosols 50-100 mCi/year. 
c) Halogens generally less than approx. 
0.5 Ci/year. 
2. LIQUID EFFLUENTS 
a) Mixed fission and corrosion products 
(tritium excluded). Less than 10 Ci/ 
year to a few tens of Ci/year. 
Typical values: approx. 0.03 Ci/MWe 
a year. 
b) Tritium: a few tens (BWR) to thou-
sands (PWR) of curies/year. 
Typical values for BWR: approx. 0.05 
Ci/MWe a year. 
Typical values for PWR: 10-20 Ci/ 
MWe a year. 
In order to obtain an idea of what these 
activity releases represent in terms of 
population exposure, one has to consider 
the different pathways through which the 
activity can reach man. 
The (calculated) exposure values due 
to radioactive effluent releases from 
nuclear power plants can be broken down 
as follows: 
dose rate 
(mrem/year) 
at site at 5 km 
boundary 
Noble gases 
PWR < 1 < 0.1 
BWR < 5 < 1 
Aerosols and iodine 
(inhalation) < 0.5 < 0.05 
With regard to the exposure due to the 
consumption of milk contaminated with 
iodine-131, an evaluation which is too 
imprecise to be of any practical signifi-
cance, it can be noted that I ' 3 ' has never 
been detected in milk produced near a 
nuclear power plant (detection limit about 
10 pCi/liter, corresponding to a thyroid 
dose in a small child of about 40 mrem/ 
year). 
Dose rates due to the activity released 
with liquid effluents are conversely 
estimated to be less than 1 mrem/year. 
3. Comparison between the exposure of 
man to radiation originating from 
nuclear power plant operations and that 
from other radiation sources 
Section II.A.2 above shows that the 
only normal radioactive effluent releases 
from nuclear power plants which are 
worthwhile assessing in terms of the dose 
limits for the public are the gaseous 
effluents and more particularly the rare 
gases. At present, radioactive effluents 
from fuel processing plants play a minor 
role in the radiation exposure of the 
population. 
By way of a comparison of human 
exposure to radiation from radioactive 
effluents released by nuclear plants with 
exposures from other sources of ionizing 
radiation, Table IV gives a survey of 
dose-rates to man from various radiation 
sources as well as the whole-body dose 
limits for different population groups. 
These data indicate that the doses to 
critical population groups in the vicinity 
of nuclear power stations do not exceed 
1/100 of the dose limits for such popula-
tions as fixed by the Euratom standards 
and correspondingly no more than about 
1/20 of the radiation dose due to the 
natural background. 
4. Application of "practical" discharge 
standards 
Until recently most discharge limits for 
radioactive effluents from nuclear power 
plants were fixed so as to ensure that the 
radiological dose limits to members of 
the population in the environment of the 
plants were not exceeded. Experience has 
shown that the actual releases in both 
gaseous and liquid form were always far 
below these "radiologically" acceptable 
limits. 
On the basis of this experience and 
with the aim of reducing man's exposure 
to a practicable minimum, radiation 
protection authorities in several Member 
States and in other countries have recently 
recommended, or set, much more re-
strictive limits on discharges from nuclear 
power stations than those formerly 
accepted. In certain cases these "prac-
tical" limits may be exceeded (theore-
tically up to the ceiling of the radiological 
values), provided that adequate grounds 
are furnished and are accepted by the 
licensing authorities. 
Such "as low as practicable" or "design 
objective" standards (corresponding to 
actual experience) serve in particular the 
purpose of long-term caution and fore-
casting. 
5. Medium- and long-term forecast for the 
long-lived nuclides krypton-85 (half-life 
= 10.4 years) and tritium (half-life = 
12.4 years) from nuclear power plants 
a) Influence of additional retention equip-
ment 
First of all, it should be pointed out 
that such forecasts have to be handled 
with care, partly because of a probable 
increase in the use of additional retention 
equipment or methods. 
Several techniques are already in use 
or under development for reducing the 
discharge of radioactive gaseous effluents 
from power stations (as well as from re-
processing plants), with the particular 
aim of storing the long-lived Kr 8 5 (half-
life = 10.4 years) and the short-lived 
X e 1 3 3 (5.3 days) on a temporary or 
permanent basis. 
By way of an example, a large twin 
1 600 MWe (total) BWR station with the 
usual short-time hold-up equipment 
could cause several tens of mrem/year 
individual average whole-body dose due 
to noble gases at the plant boundary. This 
would be reduced by a factor of 10 by a 
recombiner and charcoal delay system. 
As regards tritium (H3) , there is no 
practical way of keeping it from being 
released into the environment. Total 
coolant recycling could be applied, but 
a build-up of tritium would merely shift 
the problem (e.g., containment contami-
nation and purging) with most likely a 
greater hazard to the professionally 
exposed. 
The general conclusion to be drawn 
concerning the additional retention equip-
ment mentioned here is that the advan-
tage of reduced releases to the environ-
ment has to be weighed against the greater 
potential hazards "in-plant" or during 
subsequent transportation and storage of 
the accumulated waste. 
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b) Future estimated releases ofkrypton-85 
and tritium from nuclear power plants 
Allowing for the reservations pointed 
out in the preceding section, a rough 
estimate can easily be made for releases 
from power plants up to 1985 for pur­
poses of comparison with the expected 
releases from reprocessing plants under 
the same programme. The estimates 
summarized in Table V are based on: 
1. the nuclear power forecast for the 
Community of Six (Chapter I, Table 
I), 
2. typical BWR and PWR releases quot­
ed in Section II.A.2 2, 
3. and assuming half the units of the 
PWR type and the other half of the 
BWR type. 
There seems to be little point in making 
long-term forecasts as it is impossible to 
foresee the technological developments 
which will influence the release situation. 
The estimates given here will be 
compared with those for releases of Kr 8 3 
and H 3 from fuel processing plants (see 
next section). 
B. Radioactive gaseous and liquid 
effluents produced during routine 
operation of fuel processing plants: 
medium- and long-range estimates 
A considerable quantity of radioactive 
material is produced during the operation 
of power reactors, most of it in the fuel 
elements where it is retained until they 
year 
yea gases 
2 BWR ~ 10 3 C i / M W e 
PWR ~ 10 C i / M W e 
BWR ~ 5 'X I G " - C i / M W e — year 1 , ... 
PWR ~ 20 C i / M W e — year ƒ t n t , u m 
r \ ran 
r ƒ gas 
are reprocessed. Reprocessing is the 
operation in the fuel cycle in which the 
largest quantity of radioactivity is dealt 
with and is therefore the source of most 
of the different kinds of radioactive 
waste. 
1. Radioactive waste produced as a result 
of the reprocessing of irradiated fuel 
Categories and types of waste 
Reprocessing is the operation in which 
the fissile materials are separated from the 
products contained within the irradiated 
fuel and the materials recovered then 
purified. 
At present, the main process used on 
an industrial scale is aqueous reproces­
sing. All the operations involved in 
reprocessing lead to the production of 
radioactive wastes of different types and 
categories; these break down into solid 
waste consisting mainly of the fuel 
cladding material, gaseous waste (consist­
ing of the gaseous fission products 
contained in irradiated fuel, such as 
Kr 8 5 , X e 1 3 3 , I ' 3 1 and H 3 ) and aqueous 
wastes made up chiefly of all the non­
volatile fission products after the fissile 
material has been extracted. 
2. Discharge of radioactive effluents into 
the environment 
Since the reprocessing plant is the point 
at which a large proportion of the radio­
active waste produced during the irradia­
tion of the fuel in nuclear power stations 
is accumulated, it is also the main point 
of discharge in the entire fuel cycle (fuel 
fabrication, power plants; enrichment, 
reprocessing). 
Table V: Future estimated releases of krypton-85 and tritium from nuclear power plants. 
Year 
1972 
1975 
1980 
1985 
Installed 
power 
thousands 
MWe 
5.5 
12 
45 
100 
Kr8 5 (PWR) Kr8 5 (BWR) Kr8 5 (total) 
(Ci/year) 
10' 
2 κ 10-' 
7.4 κ 10" 
1.65 κ IO3 
1.35 κ 10' 
3 κ 10' 
1.1 κ IO5 
2.5 κ 10ϋ 
2.35 κ 10' 
5 κ 10' 
1.85 χ IO5 
4.1 κ IO5 
Η 3 (PWR) Η 3 (BWR) Η 3 (total) 
(Ci/year) 
5.4 κ 10' 
1.2 κ IO5 
4.5 κ IO5 
10« 
135 
300 
1.13 κ IO3 
2.5 κ IO3 
5.4 χ 10" 
1.2 χ ΙΟ5 
4.5 χ 105 
106 
Table VI: Quantities of Kr 8 5 and H 3 produced in relation to the quantities of fuel to be re­
processed (Illustrative Programme of the Community of Six: LWR fuel). 
Year 
1975 
1980 
1982 
1985 
(2000 
Fuel 
to be reprocessed 
tonnes/year 
110 
720 
1 200 
1 940 
~ 9 0 0 0 ' 
Kr 8 5 
Ci/year 
1 χ 10« 
7 χ 10« 
1 χ 107 
1.7 x 107 
~ 8 κ 10' 
H 3 
Ci/year 
8 χ 104 
5 χ 105 
8 χ 105 
1.4 X 10e 
~ 6 x 106) 
/ Quantity influenced largely by proportion of LWR uranium fuel and plutonium fuel (recycle and FBR). 
Two types of effluents—gaseous and 
liquid—are discharged into the environ­
ment by reprocessing plants. The maxi­
mum discharge rates for both these 
effluents are also based on "radiological" 
protection standards such as those of the 
European Atomic Energy Community 
and the ICRP recommendations. 
The discharge limits for a particular 
reprocessing installation are laid down in 
accordance with the basic and derived 
standards, a minimum dilution factor 
being taken into account for the point 
of discharge under consideration. 
a) Gaseous waste 
In the present state of the art, the 
gaseous waste from reprocessing installa­
tions is mainly made up of the rare gases 
Kr 8 5 , X e 1 3 3 and some of the H 3 in the 
fuel. Fuel cooled for 150 days contains 
only a small quantity of X e 1 3 3 as a result 
of the decay of this isotope. Iodine-131 
(half-life = 8.1 days) is almost completely 
eliminated by decay during the cooling 
of the fuel and by specific "off-gas" 
treatments to retain the iodine. 
b) Liquid waste 
The liquid radioactive wastes discharg­
ed by a reprocessing plant consist of 
liquids which have been subjected to 
decontamination treatment and therefore 
contain only very small quantities of 
radioactive nuclides. 
c) Forecasts for the discharge of radio­
active effluents 
A natural consequence of the growing 
use of nuclear energy will be an increase 
in the quantities of radioactive waste 
from plants reprocessing irradiated fuel. 
The quantities of nuclides from which 
no retention treatment is currently 
employed in reprocessing plants, par­
ticularly Kr 8 5 and H 3 , will therefore 
increase in proportion to the installed 
nuclear power. 
It should be pointed out that the 
discharge of H 3 in gaseous form by 
reprocessing plants represents only a 
fraction (max 10%) of the total quantity 
of H 3 in the fuel. Most of the H 3 appears 
in liquid form (tritiated water) and is 
discharged with low-radioactivity liquids. 
The maximum permissible concentration 
of Kr 8 5 and H 3 in the atmosphere is of 
the same order of magnitude. 
EUSPA 13-8 
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C. Long-range effects of exposure on 
mankind: medium- and long-range 
forecasts for the growth in the 
number of nuclear power plants and 
reprocessing plants 
1. Conservative nature of estimates 
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In the estimation of the long-range 
effects which the potential exposure due 
to nuclear power plant development will 
have on the population (general public), 
a conservative approach is mostly adopt-
ed, it being assumed that up to the year 
1990 or 2000 there will be no significant 
contribution from advanced type reactors 
(especially LMFBR). The long-range 
effects of fuel reprocessing of plutonium 
thermal fuel (plutonium recycle) and 
plutonium fast breeder reactor (FBR) 
fuel may become significant around 
1990-2000. The decay time before the 
processing operation starts may be short 
in the case of FBR fuel (30 days as 
compared to 150 days for LWR fuel) 
because of economies in the Pu cycle, 
which leads to a significantly higher 
amount of radioactivity at the time of 
reprocessing, especially for the relatively 
short-lived isotopes X e 1 3 3 and I 1 3 1 . 
Generally speaking, estimates do not 
take into consideration further develop-
ments in hold-up and retention tech-
niques, so that the conservative nature 
of the results arrived at is further 
enhanced. 
2. Results 
a) Krypton-85 and tritium 
From Tables V and VI (Part 1) it can 
be deduced that, as far as "global" 
releases of Kr 8 5 into the atmosphere are 
concerned, reprocessing operations are 
determinant (by a factor of 100 over 
nuclear power plants), whilst tritium 
releases are practically equal for both 
types of nuclear installation. The same 
would apply on a world-wide basis. 
b) Globed effects of krypton-85 
On the basis of the world-wide energy 
forecasts, and assuming that Kr 8 5 is 
continuously released and accumulated 
in the atmosphere, its average annual 
contribution to the individual whole-body 
dose for the public could be at the most 
about 0.05 mrem by the year 2000 
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(corresponding to an accumulated 3.150 
χ IO6 Ci), and about 0.15 mrem by 
2050. As was mentioned previously, 
about 99% of this would be due to 
reprocessing operations. With respect to 
the "global" effects, the increase in the 
quantity of Kr8 = in the environment 
attributable to the use of nuclear energy 
in the world would not give rise to a 
significant radiation hazard by the end 
of the 21st century, as compared with 
differences in the natural background 
from one region to another, although 
there might be some regional accumula­
tions of Kr 8 3 . It is most likely, however, 
that by that time retention equipment 
will be installed, mainly for "local" 
requirements, as outlined below. 
c) Global effects of tritium 
The cosmic tritium equilibrium is of 
the order of 100 κ 10 curies (the natural 
background radiation due to tritium is 
about ten times this because of residual 
tritium from weapons tests fall-out). By 
the turn of the century, the tritium 
accumulated as a result of nuclear power 
generation in the world would also total 
100 million curies (about 6% of the 
amount which was present in 1963, on 
account of weapon tests). After the year 
2000, nuclear power will become the main 
source of tritium in the biosphere and 
troposphere unless retention means are 
developed. At present the estimated 
individual dose to a member of the 
population at large ranges from 0.04 to 
0.06 mrem/year, the higher figure being 
mainly due to residual tritium from weap­
ons tests. By the year 2000 the average 
dose would be only about 0.02-0.03 
mrem/year. On a "global" basis tritium 
can be considered to present even less of 
a hazard than Kr 8 5 . 
d) Local effects of krypton-85 and 
xenon-133 releases 
Rather than the "global" effects, it is 
the local consequences of Kr8:> releases 
near large capacity (5-10 tons/day) re­
processing plants which may require 
caution (Kr8 3 releases of more than 107 
Ci/year). Quite apart from the trend 
towards larger reprocessing plants, a 
gradual increase in the burn-up of the 
fuel to be processed also increases the 
production of Kr 8 5 . Furthermore, in the 
case of Pu fuel processing the X e 1 3 3 
contribution may become determinant 
(see Section U.C. 1). A reprocessing plant 
with a capacity of 5-10 ton/day would 
Table 1: Estimated average whole-body 
radiation (mrem/'person-year from various 
sources). 
Natural 
background 
Medical 
Global fall-out 
(weapons) 
Miscellaneous ' 
Occupational 2 
Other 
environmental 
(nuclear power 
and associated 
industry) 
1970 
110 
90 
5 
3 
0.8 
0.07 
2000 
110 
100 
5 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
/ Television, air transport, consumer goods. 
2 The main contribution coming so far from 
medicine and dentistry. 
give rise to a whole-body rare gas dose 
of the order of hundreds of mrem in the 
immediate vicinity of the plant, and 
several tens of mrem at a distance of 
3 000 m (depending on the type of fuel 
treated, X e 1 3 3 being the determinant 
isotope for FBR fuel). 
It should be borne in mind that a 
"park" (multi-unit site) of several (e.g., 
10) nuclear power plants could give rise 
to equivalent local problems, mainly 
because of the "total" noble gas releases 
(the relatively short-lived Xe and 
Kr 8 3 , the main contribution coming from 
Xe 1 3 3 in this case, however). Such prob­
lems could be more serious for BWRs 
than for reprocessing plants if no addi­
tional hold-up or retention equipment 
were provided (e.g., 10 current BWRs are 
equivalent to about one 5 ton/day re­
processing plant from the standpoint of 
rare gas release). 
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These long-term considerations will 
probably also determine the development 
and use of additional equipment for the 
retention of rare gases in nuclear power 
and reprocessing plants. However, this 
raises the problem of the transportation 
and disposal of the accumulated Kr8 5 . 
e) Local effects of tritium release 
In the long term, the main aspect of 
the tritium hazard is "local" receptivity 
both for high capacity reprocessing 
plants (5-10 ton/day) and to a lesser 
extent for multi-unit groups of nuclear 
power plants (especially of the PWR 
type). For example, a 1 000 ton/year 
reprocessing plant would discharge about 
7.5 X 105 Ci/year of tritium in its liquid 
effluents, whilst ten 1 000 MWe PWR 
units would discharge about 2 χ 105 
Ci/year. In Section II.A.2 it was shown 
that exposure rates could become sig­
nificant in the immediate vicinity of such 
installations, if no large dilution capacity 
(such as fast-flowing rivers or the sea) 
were available. However, a practical 
technology might be developed some 
time in the future for removing tritium 
from liquid effluents. Also, the fraction 
of tritium released with the gaseous 
effluents (10-20%) might conceivably 
become determinant in a reprocessing 
plant. Estimates indicate that in the case 
of a plant treating about 5-10 t/day, the 
whole-body dose (mainly due to inhala­
tion from plume passage) would still be 
of the order of "tens" of mrem/year at a 
distance of 3 000 m from the plant. 
It therefore seems that on a long term 
basis, and considering "local" factors 
only, reprocessing plants will become 
determinant elements in the tritium 
hazard. 
3. Overall contribution of growth in 
nuclear power to exposure 
If consideration is given to the present 
and potential future contribution of 
nuclear energy towards mankind's total 
radiation burden, ample evidence is 
revealed to indicate that its situation in 
routine operation is a "healthy" one. 
Various estimates suggest the trend in 
the exposure of an average member of 
the population at large in a highly devel­
oped country (e.g., USA); these are 
summarized in Table I. 
It can be seen that at present the contri­
bution of the whole field of nuclear 
energy is less (see also Table IV, Part I) 
than 1 mrem/person mean annual whole-
body exposure (which is genetically 
significant). 
D. Illustrative comparison of importance 
of nuclear effluents and effluents due 
to conventional industry and consumer 
goods 
1. General 
No attempt at a comparison of nuclear 
and conventional activities has been made 
here, some examples merely being given 
in order to provide—in addition to the 
more detailed data on nuclear activities 
dealt with in other sections—a general 
idea of the relative hazards to mankind. 
Emphasis is placed here on a com­
parison of "gaseous" effluents because it 
was seen earlier that these effects are 
more important to the nuclear industry 
than discharges of liquid effluents. In 
later sections a similar illustrative com­
parison will be made of waste "storage" 
and accumulation and of thermal effects. 
2. Comparative examples 
The quantities of gaseous effluents 
discharged from conventional and nuclear 
power stations are indicated in Table II. 
It will be seen that the volume of air 
required to dilute the quantity of effluents 
released from nuclear plants in order to 
meet the permissible radiation standards 
is much smaller than that needed for con­
ventional coal and oil-fired stations to 
respect the standards governing conven­
tional pollutants, which is an indication 
of the relative cleanliness of nuclear 
power stations. 
Other data are available for industrial­
ized countries which give an idea of the 
present and probable long-term situation 
as regards pollution. 
In the USA, atmospheric pollutants 
from all conventional sources run at 
present about 125 million tonnes a year, 
12.5% of this total being due to electric 
power (mostly sulphur oxides). They are 
alleged to cause 20 000 deaths a year; 
this means that the individual's risks of 
death from this cause are about 10^4 a 
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year (cf Section VI , Part III), which is 
of the same order as the risks from all 
types of accident. 
In an urban area , 60% by weight of the 
pol lutants are at present emitted by m o t o r 
vehicles. 
The annua l rate of pollutant discharge 
in West G e r m a n y is reported to be 1.5 
κ IO6 tonnes of sulphur oxides and some 
450 x 106 tonnes of C O , (excluding the 
C O , emitted by moto r vehicles). O n the 
world scale, it is est imated that a total 
of 1.3 1 0 1 0 tonnes of C O , are at 
present discharged annual ly , compared 
with 1 0 1 2 tonnes of natural origin. 
Such examples of est imated effects may 
be set against the calculated long-term 
nuclear effects of the accumula t ion of 
K r 8 3 and t r i t ium, for instance, the fore­
seeable consequences of which would , in 
the year 2000, be by no means worrying 
on a universal (or global) basis, even 
assuming that no special re tent ion steps 
were taken. 
III. RADIOACTIVE W A S T E STOR­
AGE A N D A C C U M U L A T I O N 
A. Origin of industrial radioactive waste 
The main waste to be considered comes 
from nuclear power plants and fuel 
reprocessing plants . 
1. Power plants 
Because of the u tmost precaut ions 
taken in o rde r to keep the doses to the 
professionnally exposed within the s tan­
dards laid down and those to the popu­
lation as low as pract icable , the var ious 
effluent s t reams are purified and decon­
tamina ted (ion exchange, filters, e t c . ) . 
This leads to the product ion of medium-
level waste in solid form which is 
temporar i ly s tored at the plant sites. 
Moreover , special types of waste are also 
p roduced , such as radioactive pieces of 
equipment (e.g., pressure vessel internals) , 
which have to be handled on an ad hoc 
basis. 
2. Fuel reprocessing 
Most of the waste (in terms of activity) 
stems from reprocessing opera t ions and 
is p roduced : 
a) dur ing fuel decladding: compacted 
cladding is stored at the reprocessing 
plant site; 
Table II: Quantities of gaseous effluents discharged from conventional and nuclear power stations. 
Pollutant 
For a I 000 MWe power station 
Annual waste discharge (in millions of pounds) 
Sulphur oxides ' 
Nitrogen oxides 
Carbon monoxide 
Hydrocarbons 
Aldehydes 
Fly-ash 
(retention 97.5%) 
Coal 2 
306 
46 
1.15 
0.46 
0.12 
9.9 
Fuel oil3 
116 
48 
0.02 
1.47 
0.26 
1.6 
Gas3 
0.03 
27 
0.07 
1.0 
Nuclear 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Radioisotopes!half-life 
1 Typical values for sulphur content of USA fuels. 
2 Only fly-ash control. 
3 Without pollution control equipment. 
Annual discharge (curies) 
Radium-226/1620 years 
Radium-228/5.7 years 
Krypton-85/10.4 years 
Xenon-133/5.3 days 
Iodine-131/8.1 days 
0.017 
0.011 
0 
0 
0 
0.00015 
0.00035 
0 
0 
0 
— 
— 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
103 PWR 
10« BWR 
f 0 PWR 
{ 0.5 BWR 
7,S 
b) during extraction and purification 
operations. 
This waste is treated prior to concen­
tration and concentrated solutions then 
stored on site. 
­ The highly active liquid waste ( > 104 
Ci/m3) is concentrated so that it occupies 
the minimum volume compatible with its 
temporary storage in liquid form, pend­
ing ultimate treatment and storage in 
solid form. Temporary storage in liquid 
form for three to five years is economi­
cally justified by the decrease in activity, 
which in turn allows the volume to be 
reduced further duringfinai solidification. 
The liquid waste of medium (10~2­
104 Ci/m3) and low (■ 10" Ci/m J) 
activity produced in the plant is usually 
made up of widely differing types. The 
concentration processes to which they are 
subjected are selected depending on the 
chemical composition of the solutions 
and their activity. The most usual 
methods are evaporation, ion exchange 
and coprecipitation. During these proc­
esses the radioactivity is thus concentrat­
ed in the evaporation concentrates, the 
ion exchange resins or the precipitates, 
according to the treatment used. The 
residual solution comes into a low­
activity class and, as the case may be, 
can be discharged into the environment 
if its activity is low enough, or, if its 
activity is still above permissible levels, 
must be subjected to further treatment 
before discharge. The concentrates pro­
duced by these treatments come into a 
higher­activity class and are then dealt 
with in the same way as other waste in 
this class or are temporarily stored 
pending solidification. 
The solid or nearly solid waste produc­
ed by the treatment of low­ or medium­
activity liquid waste must later be further 
processed to facilitate handling and final 
storage or dumping. The processing 
systems most often used for this category 
are incorporation in bitumen or concrete. 
B. Storage, accumulation and ultimate 
disposal of radioactive waste from 
operation of fuel reprocessing and 
nuclear power plants: medium­ and 
long­term forecasts 
1. Reprocessing waste 
The radioactive waste produced during 
fuel reprocessing is temporarily stored at 
the reprocessing plant in liquid form 
pending its ultimate treatment and dispos­
al in place where there is no possibility 
of its dispersing into the environment. 
The presence of long­lived nuclides 
amongst the fission products implies that 
the manner in which these products are 
stored and finaily disposed of should 
ensure that dispersion into the environ­
ment can be ruled out for extremely long 
periods. 
More than 95% of the volume of the 
waste to be stored is in the form of 
high­ and medium­activity liquids. From 
the safety standpoint, their temporary 
storage in well­protected stainless steel 
tanks presents no special problem. The 
drawback of this method is that, because 
of corrosion, the tanks have to be re­
placed after a number of years (several 
decades). On account of the financial 
outlay involved and the need for spares 
to cope with possible accidental leakage, 
this type of storage is only a temporary 
solution. 
Investigations are therefore being 
conducted into various ways of storing 
these wastes for long periods. The solid 
form of the waste combines the advan­
tages of smaller volume and a limited risk 
of dispersion. The methods of solidifying 
solutions of high­ and medium­activity 
waste mentioned earlier are currently 
being studied on a pilot scale. The choice 
of the solidified product and its contain­
ment depends on the depository require­
ments and on the medium in which il is 
to be ultimately disposed of. Final dis­
posal should provide a guarantee that the 
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Table III ; : Waste produced by fuel processing (from L W R j j . 
Year 
1975 
1980 
1985 
(2000) 
accumulated 
quantities 
1975-85 
Fuel to be 
reprocessed 
t/yr 
110 
720 
1 940 
9 000 
t 
9 300 
Decladding 
waste 
m3/yr 3 
11 
72 
195 
900 
m3 
930 
Unprocessed waste 
High evel waste 
(fission products) 
m3/yr 
110 
720 
1 940 
9 000 
m3 
9 300 
Ci- ' 
0.7 χ 10» 
4.4 χ 10" 
12.0 χ 10" 
56.0 χ 10!ι 
Ci 
57.0 χ 10" 
Medium 
level 
(con­
centrates) 
m3/yr 
204 
1 080 
2915 
16 000-' 
m3 
14 000 
1 Cf assumptions in Table VI, Part I, Section II.B. 
2 The activity is expressed at the time of reprocessing for fuel cooled for 150 days; as was already 
mentioned earlier (Part I, Section II.B), Pu fuel may be subjected to lower cooling times and this may 
become important from 1985 onwards. 
3 Assuming mechanical or chop or leach decladding. 
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radioactive products will not find their 
way into the biosphere. 
It may be pointed out that on a long­
term basis a problem is posed not only by 
the high­level fission products, but also 
by the foreseeable growth in the quantity 
of transuranium elements, such as plu­
tonium, with long half­lives and high 
toxicity. 
One of the most promising methods at 
present under consideration for the final 
disposal of waste (especially high­level 
waste) consists of storing it in salt 
deposits. 
It has been estimated that between 400 
and 600 χ IO9 curie of high­level fission 
product wastes will have accumulated 
throughout the world by the year 2000, 
about one­tenth of them being due to 
strontium­90 and cesium­137. 
Table III gives an estimate of the 
annual production of different classes of 
waste, related to the quantities of fuel 
to be reprocessed, on the basis of the 
Illustrative Nuclear Programme for the 
years 1975, 1980, 1985 (and tentatively 
2000) for the Community of Six. On the 
basis of the forecasts outlined in Section I 
(Part I), the figures for the Community 
of Nine countries are about double. 
The level of annual waste production 
is fairly low up to 1985. The cumulative 
volumes in the period 1975­1985, on the 
other hand, represent a considerable 
amount in terms of both volume and 
activity. The volume of decladding waste 
is fairly small in comparison with the 
total volume of waste. Moreover, since 
it consists of metal, its storage presents 
fewer problems. 
2. Nuclear power plant waste 
a) The solid or semi­solid low­ or 
medium­activity waste resulting from 
the operation of these plants varies 
with the reactor type. Some data are 
given below for L WRs gas­cooled 
reactors and LMFBRs. 
1. LIGHTWATER REACTORS 
For LWRs the volumes of solid or 
semi­solid waste, after dewatering but 
"before" treatment and packaging, are 
reported to be those of Table IV. 
It should be noted that the specific 
activity data are representative of plants 
of different sizes with different process 
systems; they are hence not cumulative 
for a particular reactor. 
As an example of a typical two­unit 
BWR station (total about 1 600 MWe), 
840 drums/year of demineralizer resins 
fixed in concrete and 280 m3 of other 
packaged miscellaneous low­level waste 
have been estimated, giving a total yearly 
volume of 455 m3. 
As an example of a typical two­unit 
PWR station (total about 1 600 MWe) 
about 300­600 drums are expected, 
corresponding to a maximum annual 
volume of about 120 m . 
2. GAS­COOLED REACTORS AND 
FAST BREEDERS 
These volumes may be compared with 
those expected for advanced types of 
gas­cooled reactors. For the Fort St. 
Vrain plant (330 MWe), for example, an 
annual solid waste volume production 
of only 11 m3 is expected. The same order 
of magnitude is to be observed in the 
GCRs now in operation. 
For the fast breeder reactor of the 
liquid metal type (e.g., a 300­500 MWe 
plant) between 14 and 28 m3 of "packag­
ed" (drums) solid waste a year are 
expected. 
h) Relative importance of medium­level 
reprocessing waste and power reactor 
waste—accumulation of this waste 
From the information given in Section 
2.1 it can be deduced that the volume of 
medium­ and low­level packaged waste 
from LWRs is approximately the follow­
ing: 
­ for a BWR: 
455 m 3 /y r 
= 0.28 m3/MWe­yr 
1 600 MWe 
for a PWR: 
120m 3 /y r 
1 600 MWe 
0.07 m3/MWe­yr 
From the nuclear power forecasts 
outlined in Section I (Part I), the 
quantités produced yearly and accumu­
lated quantities can be deduced. It will 
suffice here to indicate that in 1985, for 
instance, on the assumption of 50% BWR 
stations and 50% PWR stations, the 
yearly production would be (for 100 000 
MWe installed): 
­ BWR: 
50 x 103 MWe x 
χ 0.28 m3 /MWe = 14 > 103 m3 
- PWR: 
50 κ IO3 MWe x 
κ 0.07 m3 /MWe = 3.5 : IO3 m 3 
total 17.5 IO3 n r 
By rough comparison with the volume 
of medium­level waste produced by 
corresponding fuel reprocessing oper­
ations, the total accumulated wastes for 
the decade 1975­85 can be quickly 
estimated. 
A 5 t/day reprocessing plant (about 
1 500 t/year) would produce about 
2 100 m3/year of medium­level con­
centrates (unprocessed and unpackaged) 
(see Table III, column 5). Processed and 
packaged, this may correspond to about 
4 000 m3/year. Such a reprocessing plant 
could serve about 45 000 MWe, or 46 
nuclear power units of the L WR type. 
These nuclear power units would produce 
yearly (assuming half BWR and half 
PWR) about 7 800 m3 of low­ and 
medium­level waste (processed and pack­
aged). Broadly speaking, then, nuclear 
power (under these hypotheses) causes 
Table IV 
BWR 
spent resins 
sludges (condensate) 
clean­up systems 
PWR 
spent resins 
evaporator bottoms 
Volume (nvfyr) Activity (Ci/m3) 
5.6 ­ 11.2 < 7 
22 ­ 64 from 3.5 to 70 
4.8 ­ 7 
1.4 ­ 4.2 
1 75 - 3 500 
< 35 
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about twice the "processed" waste 
volume produced as a result of re-
processing operations. 
In conclusion, the problem of the 
accumulation, packaging, transport and 
ultimate disposal of these wastes is 
considerable, but it is not more serious 
than the equivalent problems posed by 
conventional industrial waste of a 
hazardous nature. 
IV. THERMAL WASTE 
FROM NUCLEAR POWER 
1. General 
This section contains a synthesis of the 
data and considerations relating to the 
thermal effects on the environment 
resulting from the operation of nuclear 
power stations and their relationship to 
other sources of thermal effects. 
Most thermal power plants, whether 
conventional (fossil-fuelled) or nuclear, 
use a body of cold water, such as the sea, 
a river or a lake, to dissipate a consider-
able portion of the heat generated which, 
for fundamental thermodynamic reasons, 
cannot be transformed into electrical 
energy. 
Over the past few years, the effects of 
the increase in the temperature of the 
waters close to these power plants have 
formed the subject of many studies and 
research programmes. The large quantity 
of literature on the subject shows in 
particular that these effects are still not 
well known, but also that so far directly 
harmful phenomena have not been 
identified. Nevertheless, certain prob-
lems connected with the release of waste 
calories are now often referred to as 
"thermal pollution", because the fore-
seeable increase in the use of electrical 
energy in the industrialized countries 
suggests that irreversible damage would 
be done to the environment in the next 
few decades if precautions were not 
taken. 
These preoccupations are based on two 
main considerations, namely: 
a) A relatively slight temperature rise can 
have a considerable effect on the 
natural balance of the ecological 
system of the river, lake, etc., into 
which the heat is dissipated. The 
resultant changes generally constitute 
an impoverishment as soon as certain 
temperature limits are exceeded. 
h) In the extreme case, heat released into 
the rivers and inland waters could heat 
up some of them to the point at which 
their fauna or flora were in danger. 
2. Main factors involved in the problems 
- In a fossil-fuelled power plant, 38% of 
the thermal energy is converted into 
useful electrical energy, while 53% 
must be evacuated by the cooling water 
and 9% is dissipated through the stack. 
- In a water-cooled nuclear power plant, 
about 32% (31-33%) of the heat is 
converted into electricity, while 68% 
must be dissipated into the aqueous 
heat sink (river, lake, sea). 
- In HTGR power plants, the efficiency 
may amount to about 45%, so that 55% 
of the heat produced has to be dis-
charged into the aqueous heat sink. 
- In breeder reactors, the efficiency is 
about 40%, leaving 60% of the heat to 
be discharged. 
- The condenser ratio "loss/useful pow-
er" is thus: 
for a fossil-
fuelled plant = 1.4 (1.6 total ratio) 
for a L WR plant = 2.1 
fora HTGR 
plant = 1.2 
for a breeder 
plant = 1.5 
Therefore, per kWh of electricity 
produced, LWR plants have to reject 
about 50% more heat to the aqueous 
environment than fossil-fuelled plants 
(HTGR 14% less and an FBR 7% more). 
For the same "thermal" energy produced, 
the LWR heat rejection to the aqueous 
environment is about 28% more than that 
from the fossil-fuelled plant. 
- In the Community, it is estimated that, 
in the future, nuclear power plants will 
meet an increasing proportion of elec-
tricity requirement, namely, 22% in 
1975, 26% in 1980, 40% in 1985 and 
almost 80% in 2000. 
- In the industrialized countries, the need 
for electrical energy doubles about ev-
ery 8-10 years; even if energy require-
ments in all their forms were to increase 
less rapidly in the future than in the re-
cent past, it must be assumed that 
demand for electricity will still increase 
at an important rate. 
- For economic reasons, greater power 
units are used; this results, however, 
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in local concentrations of thermal 
discharges. 
A degradation in the ecological system 
of the waters into which the excess heat 
is released is in itself a loss which is 
difficult to quantify. In addition, an 
increase in the temperature can lead 
to the destruction of the self-purifica-
tion mechanism and endanger further 
use of the water body for drinking or 
industrial purposes. 
In spite of the enormous quantities 
involved, the possibilities for recover-
ing the thermal waste from power 
stations are very limited, apart from a 
few special cases. 
3. Survey of suitable heat dissipation 
methods 
The main methods of obtaining cooling 
water for the condenser are the following: 
a) Once-through direct cycle 
The fresh water (from the lake or river) 
passes through the condenser before being 
discharged directly into the environment. 
This is the method normally used in the 
past, and is generally the most econom-
ical. 
b) Artificial lakes or reservoirs 
The fresh water passes through the 
condenser and is discharged to allow the 
heat to be dissipated by radiation and 
convection before being returned to the 
condenser. The trend is increasingly 
towards this method, sometimes combin-
ed with a spray-type cooling system. 
c) Salt-water cooling 
This type of cooling has also been used 
for many years. However, the corrosion 
problems usually entail higher costs than 
fresh water cooling systems. 
d) Cooling towers 
Wet cooling towers can be used if there 
are only limited supplies of cooling water. 
Here most of the heat is dissipated by the 
natural or forced evaporation of a small 
proportion of the water from the con-
denser. This type of tower is most 
frequently used for large power stations; 
the natural circulation type is employed 
in particular in Europe and the ventilat-
ed, forced-circulation type in the United 
States. 
e) Air cooling towers 
The principles on which dry cooling 
towers work is the direct transfer of heat 
to the ambient air via a tubular radiator. 
This type of tower costs more to build 
than wet towers. 
4. Some advantages and drawbacks of 
certain commonly used cooling systems 
Each of the methods given above has 
its advantages and drawbacks from the 
environmental point of view. First of all, 
with regard to costs, the situations in 
Europe and the United States, for 
example, are not necessarily comparable. 
Unlike the situation in the United States, 
the capital costs for the direct cycle fresh 
water system and for (wet) cooling towers 
in Europe are of the same order of 
magnitude. However, the cost of the 
power generated is about 5-6% higher in 
the case of cooling towers because of the 
reduction in the vacuum effect of the 
turbine. The increase in the cost of energy 
produced with the aid of air cooling 
towers ranges from 10% (natural circula-
tion) to 15% (forced circulation). 
In the case of light-water nuclear power 
plants (PWR and BWR) the use of (dry) 
air cooling towers is unsuitable (because 
of the saturated steam form the turbine). 
However, for high-temperature reactors, 
with the possible use of gas turbines in 
the future, these air cooling towers have 
an advantage because of the increased 
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temperature difference in relation to the 
cooling air. 
For water-cooled power plants, pref­
erence is given in Europe to natural-
circulation (natural draft) wet cooling 
towers. Apart from economic consider­
ations militating in favour of this choice, 
the water vapour from this type of cool­
ing system disperses quickly and the 
likelihood of the formation of low mist is 
substantially reduced, thus rendering it 
acceptable from the microclimatological 
standpoint. In addition, the capital cost 
of natural-circulation wet towers is lower. 
It is nevertheless quite possible that if 
construction costs in Europe rise and 
electricity generating costs continue to 
drop, "forced"-circulation (mechanical 
draft) wet towers will become economi­
cally interesting in the future (cf. United 
States i ) . 
However, environmental problems 
could then arise, especially in the case 
of plants in urban areas, because of the 
presence of various dusts and the for­
mation of low mist. 
5. General criteria (standards) 
Basically each site has its own partic­
ularities and has to be assessed from the 
standpoint of waste heat dissipation on 
its own merits, so that it is difficult to 
fix general criteria. Nevertheless, some 
general guidelines have recently been 
issued in West Germany, for instance. 
These can be summarized as follows: 
- "after mixing", the cooling water 
released from power plants should 
never (in any season) heat up the 
aqueous medium by more than 3 °C, 
or in exceptional circumstances 5 °C; 
- the temperature of the cooling water 
discharged should not exceed 30 C, 
or in exceptional circumstances 35 C; 
- the temperature of the "mixed" water 
should not exceed the following limits: 
a) 25 °C for waters having summer 
mean temperatures between 17 and 
20 °C (and peak temperatures of 
23 C); 
h) 28 C for waters having summer 
peak temperatures of 25 "C. 
Usually these guidelines can easily be 
met. A controversial point still to be 
3 in the USA : 
— wet mechanical draft tower : $ 10-12/kW; 
— wet natural draft tower : S 15-20/kW. 
settled is that of at what point down­
stream full "mixing" occurs. 
Similar but rather more detailed 
criteria have been issued in the United 
States by the National Technical Advi­
sory Committee on Water Quality Cri­
teria. 
6. Local and global long-term effects 
a) General 
As in the case of the routine releases of 
gaseous radioactive waste from a growing 
nuclear industry (Section II.B, Part I), 
the question of discharged waste heat can 
be considered from the standpoint of the 
local effects on the one hand and of the 
world-wide consequences on the other. 
Notwithstanding the fact that LWR 
nuclear power stations have to dissipate 
more waste heat than conventional 
plants, the global and local problems to 
be examined are not significantly different 
in the two cases. 
b) Global effects 
Rough illustrative estimates have been 
made on the basis of electricity produc­
tion forecasts. 
It emerges that, on the assumption 
that the once-through direct cycle system 
only will be applied in certain highly 
industrialized countries, by the turn of 
the century a major proportion of the 
available inland waters will be used for 
cooling purposes (as much as two-thirds 
of all inland waters in the United States). 
The situation will probably be roughly 
the same in Europe. However, the 
ultimate heat sink for power plants is the 
atmosphere. If it is assumed that at the 
plant sites all the heat will be dissipated 
by the evaporation of water, the inland 
water thus consumed would represent a 
minor fraction of the water available 
(about 1% in the USA). 
Another indicative example can be 
quoted. Solar radiation provides about 
100 000 times as much heat as all the 
electrical energy currently produced in 
the world. Assuming no heat losses from 
the earth by radiation, the rise in the 
earth's temperature has been estimated 
to be about 3 JC annually. On the same 
assumption, all the heat released by 
conventional and nuclear power plants 
during the period from 1970 to 2000 
would increase the temperature of the 
earth's surface by only 0.5 °C and only 
after a period of operations ranging from 
10 000 to 100 000 years. 
It would therefore seem that no global 
problem arises as long as the artifical 
addition of heat on a planetary scale 
remains negligible in relation to solar 
thermal energy. 
A more serious long-term problem, 
relating to global thermal considerations 
and possible climatic changes, is that of 
the accumulation of C 0 2 in the atmo­
sphere (see Section II.D.2) because of the 
imbalance between its formation and 
reabsorption which may occur in the 
future. 
c) Local effects 
Locally, the thermal problems are by 
no means negligible. For example, the 
artificial residual heat to be dissipated in 
an urban area in the year 2000 has been 
estimated at about 1.4 χ IO6 cal/m2 (500 
Btu '/sq. ft), compared with 2.8 κ 106 
cal/m2 (1 000 Btu/sq. ft) due to solar 
radiation. Again, however, this is not a 
specifically nuclear problem. 
The standards drawn up in various 
countries—and applying to all methods 
of generating electricity and to other 
industries producing residual heat—have 
so far resulted only in fairly general 
guidelines. These could be rendered more 
specific by drawing on research results 
and by the developing dispersion models 
and correlated methods of calculation. 
The possible local thermal effects can 
only be countered by a suitable choice of 
sites and/or by additional methods of 
protection (artificial cooling). This will 
become more and more imperative with 
the development of multi-unit sites. With 
this in mind, the use of sea-shore or 
off-shore sites may increase significantly 
in countries where such solutions are 
practicable. 
The foreseeable medium and long-term 
outlook for the development of HTGR 
and breeder reactors is no doubt advan­
tageous from the standpoint of thermal 
effects but should not be regarded as 
essential on this count. 
Finally, it may be concluded that these 
problems are not peculiar to nuclear 
power production and therefore should 
be dealt with in the context of measures 
designed to combat excessive thermal 
pollution from industrial sources in 
general. 
EUSPA 13-9 
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V. ACCIDENT POTENTIAL, ACCI-
DENT PREVENTION AND LIMI-
TATION OF POSSIBLE CONSE-
QUENCES 
1. Precautions of an administrative nature 
All nuclear installations are subject to 
strict control by various authorities re-
sponsible for granting building and 
operating licences according to the pro-
cedures and legal requirements in force 
in each country. Equally stringent pre-
cautions are seldom found in conven-
tional (even hazardous) industrial activ-
ities or in the use of consumer goods 
(automobiles). 
2. Precautions of a technical nature 
The common factor inherent in this 
type of control consists in a detailed in-
depths analysis of the technical safety 
features of the installation as a whole, 
and in particular of the systems and 
equipment designed to limit the radiol-
ogical or other consequences of all 
conceivable failures and accidents. 
The technical examination of the safety 
aspects is made first by the design group 
itself and then by the future operator of 
the installation. Subsequently, an in-
dependent investigation is carried out by 
the safety and control body delegated by 
the appropriate regulatory authorities. 
This independent investigation results in 
a comparison of the data and opinions 
supplied on the one hand by the pro-
moters (designer and operator) and on 
the other by the safety and control bodies. 
A great deal of effort goes into this 
procedure. 
It may also be considered that these 
efforts and the confrontation between 
promoters and "safety and control" 
bodies lead to a plant design and limited 
operating conditions of a severity and 
conservatism unequalled in the non-
nuclear industries. It is only since recently 
that equally detailed safety analyses have 
sometimes been applied in hazardous 
conventional industries (e.g., the petro-
leum and chemical sectors). 
Operators and control bodies must also 
constantly monitor the quality require-
ments imposed on equipment during 
manufacture, assembly and prolonged 
operation (30-40 years). 
S 6 
There is at present an increasingly 
marked tendency to develop—both 
nationally and internationally—"techno-
logical" standards5 (criteria, codes and 
complementary requirements, guidelines, 
etc.) with the aim of standardizing the 
methods of design and construction used 
and the operating limits imposed. This 
tendency will undoubtedly increase fur-
ther with the growth in the use of nuclear 
power and as the prospect for an inter-
national market for designs and equip-
ment becomes brighter. 
3. Conceivable serious radiological con-
sequences 
In the case of industrial nuclear 
installations, potentially the largest acci-
dent hazard capable of affecting the 
general public (population "at risk" and 
"at large") will, for many years to come, 
be that due to power reactors. Generally, 
several types of potential accident and 
the corresponding means of mitigating 
the consequences form the subject of 
detailed analyses. More and more 
frequently these analyses incorporate 
probabilistic considerations such as com-
parative analyses of the reliability of 
protection and emergency systems or 
classifications of accidents according to 
their severity. 
Moreover, the probabilistic approach 
to the analysis of accidents, which tends 
to link the probability of events to the 
seriousness of the consequences, also 
seems promising in the long run. How-
ever, the systematic and quantitative use 
of nuclear accident probabilities which 
would be considered acceptable for the 
general public and the application of 
these acceptable (tolerable) risks as plant 
design "target criteria" still gives rise to 
psychological and practical problems 
(e.g., uncertainty of the statistical data 
used and taken as the basis of com-
parison). 
For accidents of maximum conceivable 
seriousness, it is generally considered 
acceptable for an individual member of 
the population to receive 25 rem of 
whole-body irradiation (somatic and 
genetic effects) and 15-25 rem of irradia-
tion of the thyroid gland (a distinction 
sometimes being made between adult and 
5 As opposed to "radiation" protection standards, 
dealt with in Section 11 (Part 1), for instance. 
child doses). The precautions limiting the 
effects of serious accidents on the environ-
ment (e.g., containment, ventilation and 
associated filtering systems) vary to a 
certain extent with the location and 
features of a particular reactor. Broadly 
speaking, however, it may be said that, 
for a 1 000 MWe plant, the total in-
tegrated individual irradiation doses 
would lie between about 0.1 and 10 rem 
(mainly due to whole-body irradiation 
from noble gases), whereas the accident 
doses due to radioactive iodine would 
generally be between 0.01 and 0.1 rem. 
With the development of FB reactors 
and thermal Pu recycling, the accident 
considerations will have to include the 
hazards involved with plutonium. 
It is likely that in the future more 
attention will be directed at accidents 
which have their origin in "external" 
causes against which no explicit protec-
tion is factored into the design. Examples 
of such external causes are aircraft 
crashes or even sabotage. 
In general terms, it should be pointed 
out, firstly, that conventional industries 
and activities are also fraught with com-
parable external hazards and, secondly, 
that the method of protecting man against 
such hazards can therefore only be the 
same for both conventional and nuclear 
activities, e.g., siting away from airports 
and aerodromes, administrative security 
measures, exceptional police measures, 
etc. 
4. Present and future siting implications 
Together with routine operating con-
ditions (e.g., radioactive effluents, ther-
mal effects, etc.), the accident analysis 
doses thus estimated determine the 
acceptability of the chosen sites with 
regard to the present and foreseeable 
population distribution around nuclear 
plants. 
It should be noted that: 
- "Site criteria" (if based on "accident" 
considerations) often lead to per-
missible "exceptions" being made to 
the "basic" requirements. 
- Siting practices are fairly divergent 
from one country to another (and even 
within one country) and from the safety 
standpoint are mostly still dealt with 
on a "case by case" basis, account 
being taken of possible additional 
preventive or accident-mitigating safe-
guards. 
In a growing nuclear industry there 
will be—in the next decade—a need for 
more generally applicable site selection 
requirements based on health and safety 
considerations both for "routine" and 
for "abnormal" conditions. It is also 
likely that, with a growing fraction of 
population "at risk" (as compared to the 
rest of the population not living in the 
vicinity of a nuclear plant), the concept 
of integrated man-rem dose will be more 
usefully applied in the future. 
For fuel processing plants, the site 
selection will always remain a "case" 
study based essentially on "routine" 
operating conditions and certainly less 
related to potential accident conditions. 
5. Present situation and future outlook 
Up to 1970, ninety power plants 
distributed over the whole world had 
produced 250 million MWh of electricity 
and accumulated 650 years of experience 
without any significant accidents from 
the point of view of the population at 
large. 
It may be hoped that, by the continued 
applications of strict standards and 
precautions and more stringent quality 
control, this positive balance can be 
maintained as the use of nuclear power 
continues to grow. 
There is no doubt that, at present, 
the record of nuclear power as compared 
with, say, conventional hazardous in-
dustries (such as the petroleum and 
chemical industries) is extremely favour-
able in terms of the material damage, 
injury or death caused to the general 
public and from the point of view of 
professional accidents (see Section VI). 
With a growing nuclear industry and the 
development of higher ratings and new 
technologies (e.g.. FBRs), the accident 
potential tends to increase and in this 
connection there is certainly every reason 
to devise methods for the quantitative 
assessment of future "risk-potential 
ranges". However, it should be empha-
sized: 
a) that this trend is not limited to the 
nuclear industry, and applies certainly 
to a similar extent to conventional 
industry and hazardous consumer 
goods also; 
b) that, alongside the increase in nuclear 
power production and the develop-
ment of new technologies, increas-
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ingly expanded nuclear safety research Table I: Probabilities of individual fatal injury (casualty) due to conventional activities and 
programmes are under way which 
have barely any counterparts in the 
conventional field. 
VI. NUCLEAR HAZARDS IN RELA­
TION TO OTHER RISKS 
The quantitative assessment of the 
hazards from normal operation or from 
accident conditions which could lead to 
material or bodily damage (to persons 
professionally exposed or to the popula­
tion in general) must be regarded with 
some circumspection because of the 
relative value of the interpretations placed 
on statistical information. A few compar­
ative figures are given here by way of 
example which show how the nuclear 
energy "hazard potential" is situated in 
relation to other industries and human 
activities the risk of which is generally 
accepted either by the individual or by 
the community. 
1. Risk In occupational duties 
a) Accidents 
Statistics covering over 22 years' oper­
ation of various types of nuclear installa­
tion (laboratories, reactors, prototypes, 
etc.) and 2.5 κ IO9 man-hours reveal 
7 693 individual cases of bodily injury 
causing disability, of which only 36 
(0.5%) were actually due to radiation 
effects. This gives an accident rate of 
7 693 
= 2.45 accidents per million 
2.5 κ 10" 
man-hours, corresponding to one-quarter 
of the national rate for all industrial 
activities for the country concerned. 
Moreover, the rate for accidents due 
36 
to radiation is only = 0.01 
2.5 χ 109 
accident per million man-hours, which 
is clearly negligible compared with the 
national rate under consideration. 
From the numerous statistics on 
accidents in various conventional in­
dustrial activities, it can be concluded 
that in industrialized countries accidents 
have an individual casualty (fatal injury) 
probability of about 10~4 per year of 
exposure and a permanent injury pro­
bability of about 10"2 . 
In comparison, the nuclear industry is 
in a very favourable position because of 
Type of risk 
Conventional 
(casualties only) 
- all diseases 
- traffic accidents 
(automobiles) 
- total mortality risk 
- accidents of all types 
- smoking 
- traffic accidents 
(in general) 
- suicide 
- falls 
- air pollution 
- industrial accidents 
- drowning 
- firearms 
- electricity 
- leukemia 
(natural causes) 
- poisoning 
- coal and oil-fired power 
stations (pollution) 
- cancer of thyroid 
(natural causes) 
- natural disasters 
- lightning 
In dividual probability 
of fatal injury per 
(o. 
5 
5 
2. 
2 
3 
2 
2 
4 
2 
5 
year of exposure 
ders of magnitude ') 
10-3 
10- ' 
10"3 (men) 
IO -4 (women) 
κ IO-4 
χ IO-1 
5 x IO"4 
χ IO-1 
io-4 
io-4 
10- ' (all ages) 
IO"5 (age 20) 
χ 10"δ 
χ ΙΟ'5 
χ ΙΟ"5 
ΙΟ"5 
ΙΟ-·1 
χ ίο-« 
io-(i 
χ ιο-° 
χ ίο- 7 
Remarks 
[ΙΟ -2 (for light, serious 
and fatal Injury)! 
/ Summary of data from various sources, with slight variations according to the country. 
sionally exposed, expressed in integrated 
man-rem, although remaining within the 
permissible radiation standards, may 
nevertheless lead to a significant ex­
posure. This will increasingly be the case 
with an expanding nuclear power pro­
duction and associated industry. This 
problem has already been tentatively 
"normally" accumulated by the profes- approached by assessing the social value 
the high level of the health and safety 
precautions taken since its birth a quarter 
of a century ago. 
b) Normal operation 
However, as has been outlined already 
in Section 11. A.2 (Part I), the doses 
ss 
to the effects of radiation. 
Effects of nuclear radia­
tion (individual injury, 
not necessarily casualty, 
except perhaps with a 
long latent time) 
1. Radiation in accident 
conditions 
(in the assumption that 
such an accident oc­
curred; "frequency" 
considerations) 
2. Radiation in normal 
operating conditions 
10-3-10-1 
IO"7 
1. Based on a linear dose 
and risk relationship 
of 30 χ 10-6/person 
per rad for total irra­
diation and 1 (any age) 
to 50 χ 10~ϋ (child) 
per person per rad for 
effects on the thyroid 
gland. 
2. Doses generally con­
sidered acceptable in 
accident conditions of 
25 rem (total irradia­
tion) and 15-25 rem in 
the thyroid are taken 
into account for this 
risk. 
1. At the rate of 1 to a 
few mrem/year, e.g., 
individual mean doses 
received around a nu­
clear installation. 
2. Estimated on the basis 
of ¡CRP data; linear 
extrapolation with 
dose and decreasing 
dose rate. 
of the man­rem concept and the econom­
ics involved in "risk" acceptance based 
on this concept and in supplementary 
protective measures. It comes down to 
the question of whether there is any 
biological difference between 50 occu­
pational people receiving 3 rem/year or 
150 persons receiving 1 rem/year (in 
both cases 150 man­rem), and how the 
total man­rem received compare with 
other industrial occupational risks. 
These considerations may become a 
further justification (besides those men­
tioned earlier with regard to the general 
public in Sections II, Part I, and V) for 
introducing "man­rem criteria" also in 
addition to the individual dose limitations 
(basic standards). 
2. Nuclear risk in general in relation to 
other risks 
Table I shows the likelihood of harmful 
effects to the public which may result 
from the use of nuclear power in relation 
to other risks readily accepted by human 
society. 
It is first of all important to recall that 
a casualty risk of 10~3 per person per 
year is generally considered unacceptable 
and means that steps must be taken to 
reduce it. At a figure of 10~4 per person 
per year we are prepared to spend money 
(generally public money) to eliminate the 
causes of accidents or mitigate their 
effects (e.g. traffic signals, publicity, 
police, fire precautions, etc.). Below a 
figure of I O ­ 3 per person per year, risks 
are considered individual risks and are 
combatted by individual warnings (e.g., 
handling of firearms, swimming, etc.). 
Risks of the order of 10~6 and below 
cause no loss of sleep at all. 
Remarks concerning Table I 
1. Genetic hazards, which do not cause 
fatal injury in the true sense, have not 
been included in this comparative 
table. However, some indications can 
be given on the basis of mutation rates 
and the genetic equilibrium of the 
population. The normal mutation rate 
has been estimated at 200 000 10" 6 
per person/generation. For an irradia­
tion of 1 rad, 7 200 χ IO"6 induced 
mutations are considered possible, 
only 2.5% of which are expected in the 
first generation. 
This risk, of about 7 κ IO" 3 , corre­
sponds to accidental conditions (dose 
of the order of 1­10 rem). For normal 
operating conditions, it would corre­
spond (according to the conservative 
linearity hypothesis) to 7 χ IO" 7 , i.e., 
once again a negligible value. 
2. The permissible doses or those actually 
received by persons professionally 
exposed to radiation and the general 
public may, for example, be compared 
with the genetic effects resulting from 
the consumption of coffee or alcohol. 
Thus, the continuous consumption of 
six cups of coffee a day would corre­
spond to the potential genetic damage 
equivalent to 5 rem/year, whereas the 
consumption of 28 ml of alcohol per 
day would correspond to 50 rem/year. 
This shows that the individual risks 
resulting from nuclear energy in 
routine operation are negligible for 
the general public, as long as the 
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stringent radiation standards now 
applied are observed. As was shown 
above, there is no reason to believe 
that this would not be the case over 
the medium and long haul. 
On the other hand, the most serious 
accident conditions conceivable lead to 
the class of risk where measures have to 
be taken. However, the structural pre-
cautions taken in nuclear installations 
are at present usually such that the radi-
ological consequences of those accidents 
which are regarded as most serious and 
the least likely to occur still remain a 
factor of about 10 below the reference 
doses on the basis of which the risk 
value of 10~3-10~4 is arrived at. 
3. Medium- and long-term risk—probabil-
istic approaches 
It is difficult to define accurately the 
quantified probabilities of the occurrence 
of various types of accident which would 
affect the environmental population and 
in particular to fix a clear-cut border-line 
between conceivable and inconceivable 
accidents. The very worst eventuality 
would be that of the release of radioactive 
material which exceeded, even by a large 
margin, the doses considered acceptable 
for emergency purposes (without evacua-
tion requirements). 
Attempts have been made to solve this 
problem semiquantitatively or quantita-
tively. The principle is to apply an 
arbitrary (but reasonably defined) inverse 
relationship between accident "frequen-
cy" and release magnitude and to apply 
this to urban, semi-ruban and remote 
sites, taking into account the severity of 
injury which could be caused by the 
respective releases, the population densi-
ties and the nuclear power production 
growth requirements. 
In order to make a valid comparison 
between nuclear and non-nuclear risks, it 
has been suggested that the "crowd-type" 
of accident hazards be used for the latter. 
A comparison with estimates of random 
aircraft crashes around airfields (a risk of 
between 1 to 100 casualties per crash) 
would, for instance, indicate a risk two 
orders of magnitude less for a semi-urban 
sited nuclear power plant. The latter 
would be about the same as the risk of 
death from meteorites. 
Perhaps the best approach to be adopt-
ed as regards "unlikely" (or inconceiv-
able) accidents involving nuclear reactors 
is to compare them with man-made 
structures potentially affecting "large" 
groups of the population (e.g., dam-type 
developments) rather than with frequently 
recurring conventional hazards affecting 
a relatively small number of people. An 
interesting example which was recently 
quoted refers to the Netherlands "Schel-
de River Delta Plan", which is designed 
to protect about a million inhabitants; 
assuming an "inconceivable" flood hap-
pens once in 10 000 years and causes 
casualties totalling 0.1% of the popula-
tion, then the risk is about 1 0 - 7 . This 
seventh order of risk is accepted by society 
with regard to the benefits. Catastrophe-
type accidents involving nuclear power 
plants and causing casualties have risk 
factors of the same order of magniture 
or even less. 
Another example of a risk can be 
quoted which is readily accepted in 
Western Europe and will never cause 
additional precautions to be taken 
(structural, warning systems, etc.). On 
13 November 1972 a storm hit Western 
Europe with wind speeds of up to 125 
m/s. This is about the most severe 
hurricane force on record over long 
periods of time in this moderate climate 
region. 
The last time a storm of equivalent 
severity affected the British Isles and the 
Continent on a wide scale was in Novem-
ber 1940, with wind speeds up to 150 m/s. 
Both these storms caused casualties, 
injuries and material damage, but infor-
mation is only available on the latest one ; 
little attention was paid to the 1940 storm, 
presumably because of war conditions. If 
we confine ourselves to the "casualties" 
out of a population of roughly 200 000 
affected, about 54 persons were killed. 
This risk, spread out over the period 
between 1940 and now (roughly 30 years) 
amounts to about 1 0 - 5 casualty risk/ 
person-year. It should also be borne in 
mind that this is certainly a "non-benefit" 
type of risk, as opposed to the previous 
examples. The risk here is two orders of 
magnitude greater than that expected 
from catastrophe-type accidents involving 
nuclear power. 
This type of estimation and comparison 
with nuclear power undoubtedly requires 
further examination but if offers inherent 
attractions on a long-term basis. 
EUSPA 13-10 
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The Commission's technical 
notes give descriptions of orig­
inal results obtained under the 
Euratom research programmes. 
Their purpose is to enable firms 
to decide whether they should 
consider industrializing these 
results. 
On the basis of article 12 of 
the Euratom Treaty, a non­ex­
clusive licence may be granted 
on the results covered by pa­
tents, in so far as the licensee 
is in a position to make effect­
ive use of these results. The 
conditions of the licence, as 
well as the royalties for tech­
nical assistance, will, for each 
individual case, be fixed after 
joint consultation. 
Requests for additional inform­
ation should be sent to: Com­
mission of the European Com­
munities, D.G. XIII­A, 29, rue 
Aldrinsen, Luxembourg. 
— 2014: Capacitive sensor for displace­
ment measurement 
This capacitive sensor is intended for 
measuring displacement or distance of 
conducting or non­conducting materials. 
The only condition of use is that the 
dielectric constant of the material to be 
measured must be different from that of 
the medium in which the measurement is 
being made. 
The sensor (1) consists of two elec­
trodes; their form, their arrangement and 
the distance between them depend on the 
kind of measurement to be made. 
One sensor, with a gap of 1 mm be­
tween the electrodes and a total capaci­
tance in air of 8 pF, has been tried out; 
it gives excellent results for rapid 
(1945 m/s) and slow (4.5 m/s) displace­
ments of the object being measured (5). 
The electronic measuring circuit consists 
of an oscillator (60 MHz) (2), a pre­
amplifier (3) and a demodulator­amplifier 
(4). 
Τ 
— 2015: Vapour concentration detector 
This is a description of a dectcctor 
suitable for the continuous measure­
ment of vapour concentrations in a car­
rier gas, such as air or any inert gas. 
A light source emits a spectrum of 
light which becomes almost monochro­
matic after passing through a series of 
filters or a monochromator. Only the 
spectral band corresponding to the 
band spectrum of the type of vapour 
to be detected is allowed to pass 
through. A photomultiplier measures 
the amount of light absorbed, and this 
is related to the vapour concentration 
by an exponential law. 
The vapour enters a tube through 
which the light passes. This tube con­
tains two quartz windows welded to the 
metal by a process developed at the 
JRC in Ispra; the Société de Verrerie 
et de Thermométrie, Paris, France, has 
been granted the licence for this proc­
ess (Technical Note 2008, euro­spec­
tra 1973, vol. XII, No. 3, p. 87). 
The tube through which the vapour 
passes may be heated to 500 "C in or­
der to avoid any condensation on the 
quartz windows and to reduce the back­
ground noise. 
A special detector has been develop­
ed for Gilotherm OM2 vapours and 
has also been used to measure the va­
pour concentrations of other refrigerat­
ing liquids, such as AKPM, HB40, 
Thermip and OMPH. The concentra­
tions measured vary between 0.02 mg/ 
I and 100 mg/1. 
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— 2016 : Electron-beam welding : optimum 
focusing 
The JRC in Ispra has developed this 
method of achieving optimum beam 
focusing of a welding electron beam gun, 
by using the infrared radiation emitted 
at the beam's point of impact, and thus 
avoiding the use of additional fittings in 
the weldcasing at the impact point. 
The infrared radiation is transformed 
into an electric signal, the amplitude and 
form of which provide information about 
the beam's optimum focusing point and 
about the form of the weld carried out 
by this means (surface weld or stud weld). 
A mechanical chopper system protects 
the radiation sensor from the metal 
vapour released by the welding process. 
It is possible for the beam concentration 
to be automatically controlled by means 
of the electric signal. 
1. Photovoltaic cell 
2. Infrared filter 
3. Gun 
4. Welding chamber ( 0 int. 800) 
5. Measuring core 
6. Welding workpiece 
7. Amplifier 
8. Gain control 
9. Rotating cylinder 
10. Rectifier 
11. Integrator 
12. Galvanometer 
— 2017: Heavy leakproof tongs 
These tongs are designed for fitting to 
remote handling devices of type M8, M9 
(or 8HD), D and F (Société La Calhène). 
In tongs commercially available until 
now, the booting acted as the seal around 
the movable parts of the body of the 
tongs. The disadvantage of this method 
was that it often led to damage to the 
booting around these movable parts. 
In tongs of the type described, sealing 
is ensured inside the tongs themselves by 
bellows. 
Brief description 
The tongs comprise two parts joined 
together by a ball-bearing interlock 
system controlled by the gripping action 
of the tongs. 
Part 1 : a jointing unit, firmly fixed to 
the stump emerging from the wrist of 
the remote handling device. 
Part 2: the tongs themselves, made from 
light alloy, consist of 4 arms controlled 
by a chain device for "traction hold-
ing". Gripper noses, which can be 
disconnected, are fixed to the extrem-
ities of the arms. The booting seal is 
fixed into a specially designed groove 
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on the upper part of the body of the 
tongs. 
Characteristics : 
- Maximum opening between gripper 
noses: 90 mm. 
- Load capacity of the tongs: 40 kg. 
This equipment, sold under the trade 
name PLK 89, is manufactured under 
licence by the Société La Calhène, 5 rue 
Emile Zola, 95-Bezons, France. 
1. Sleeve a 
2. Protective spring guide 
3. Bevel-gear stub shaft 
4. Coupling mechanism 
5. Body of leak-tight clamp — clamping 
mechanism 
— 2018: 256 Channels portable pulse 
analyser for Gamma-rays 
The necessity of a true portable ana-
lyser is apparent for many applications 
where the primary importance is related 
to the possibility to act independently 
of any external supply. 
The analyser is assembled in a com-
pletely autonomous suitcase which con-
tains: 
— integral line with Nal crystal; 
— NiCd battery for 10 hours of oper-
ation; 
— battery charger; 
— chart recorder for data output; 
— quartz controlled timer; 
— solid state display for the time in a 
preset-count operation. 
An input is provided for an external 
solid state detector (GeLi or intrinsic-
Ge). Energy ranges are selectable in 
five steps up to 2McV, and the maxi-
mum sensibility is 0.5 KeV/channel. 
The core memory (256 channels X 2 1 0 
max. content) can store up to 4 spectra 
of 64 channels. 
Two analog thresholds allow to se-
lect a restricted range of energy. Mea-
surements can be performed for pulses 
whose amplitude is comprised within 
these thresholds both in single-channel 
and in multichannel analysis. The rate 
of these pulses is also measured by a 
ratemeter (10:! pps f.s.). 
Data out possibility are the follow-
ing: 
— point recording of spectra in inter-
nal chart recorder: 
— print out on external printer (print 
driver not included); 
— display on external oscilloscope. 
The total power consumption is about 
5 W. 
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— 2019: „AE-6" electrode spharpener 
The AE-6 was designed to sharpen the 
tungsten/thorium electrodes used in arc 
and inert gas (TIG) welding of the 
miniature thermocouples which form 
part of the instrumentation controlling 
nuclear fuel elements. 
The sharp points required to weld, 
inside a sheath of 0.25 mm internal 
diameter, the hot junction of a thermo­
couple, i.e. two wires some hundredths 
of a mm in diameter, are hard to achieve 
by grinding or machining. 
Mechanical sharpening in fact causes 
the point to break. 
The AE-6 uses electroerosion in 
conjunction with an electrode mover 
device. The standard model makes 6 
points simultaneously in less than 60 min. 
and requires no supervision. 
The electrode holder, designed for a 
diameter of 1 mm, can on request be 
supplied for other dimensions, and the 
electrolytic tank for tungsten and its 
alloys can be supplied for other metals 
and their alloys. 
This simple device permits best advan­
tage to be obtained from the new types of 
TIG microwelding machines currently 
available on the market. It also provides 
extremely sharp metal points or elec­
trodes which can be used in areas other 
than microwelding, e.g. biology, medi­
cine, micro-manipulation, etc. 
The AE-6 sharpener is manufactured 
under licence by Franco Corradi, Via 
Cornaggia 11, Casella Postale 98,1-20017 
(Milan), Italy. 
Reproduction of the picture given by a 
section projector (magnification χ 100): 
A) point made by conventional method; 
B) point made by the AE-6. 
Fifth 
symposium 
on 
microdosimetry 
to be held on 22-26 September 1975 
in Verbania Pallanza (Lake Maggiore), 
Italy. 
In September 1975 the Commission 
of the European Communities will be 
holding the Fifth Symposium on Micro­
dosimetry as part of the programme on 
"Biology and Health Protection". An 
initial announcement has just been pub­
lished and is available to interested 
scientists on request. 
Earlier symposia on microdosimetry 
have highlighted the rapid development 
of microdosimetry, which is of great 
practical importance for radiological 
protection, neutron therapy and an in­
creased knowledge of the biological ef­
fects of radiation. 
The purpose of the symposium is to 
facilitate a comprehensive exchange of 
information on the progress made in 
microdosimetry and to stimulate fur­
ther research into the problems in­
volved in the spectral and spatial dis­
tribution of the energy transferred to 
irradiated tissue and in radiation energy 
deposition in organs, cells, sub-cellular 
particles and biological macromole-
cules. The physical, chemical and bio­
logical aspects of microdosimetry will 
be examined during the symposium. In 
this connection special attention will be 
paid to energy transfer and energy 
deposition by monoenergetic ions, fast 
neutrons and their secondary particles, 
as well as to radiation at low LET val-
Furthcr information can be obtained 
from: 
Conference Secretariat for the 
Fifth Symposium on Microdosimetry, 
Commission of the European 
Communities, 
DG XII - Biology Department, 
Attention Dr. H. G. EBERT, 
Rue de la Loi 200 
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel.: 735.00.40 
Telex: COMEURBRU 21877 
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Reports 1973-1974 
These reports can be obtained at the 
following address: 
Office des Publications officielles des 
Communautés européennes 
Case postale 1003 
Luxembourg-1 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. 
• Survey of the world agricultural doc-
umentation services. EUR 4680/1 e. 
• A real time operating system for 
smart data terminals. EUR 4967 e. 
• Pressure history during flashing 
caused by a sudden expansion. EUR 
5039 e. 
• Neutron spin precession in polarized 
nuclear targets. EUR 5054 e. 
• 50 MWe Kernenergiecentrale Do-
dewaard. Jaarverslag 1972. EUR 
5057 n. 
• Hydrogen production from water 
using nuclear heat. Progress Report 
No. 3 (Annual report ending Decem-
ber 1972). EUR 5059 e. 
• Convenzione Eurex Euratom-
C.N.E.N. Relazione annuale 1971. 
EUR 5062 i. 
• Radioaktive Kontamination von Le-
bensmitteln in den Gemeinschafts-
ländern im Jahre 1971. 
Contamination radioactive des den-
rées alimentaires dans les pays de la 
Communauté en 1971. 
Contaminazione radioattiva delle 
derrate alimentari nei paesi della 
Comunità nel 1971. 
Radioactieve besmetting van voe-
dingsmiddelen in de landen van de 
Gemeenschap in 1971. EUR 5063 
d. f, i, n. 
• Irradiation of plutonium fuelled 
coated particles in FRJ 2. EUR 
5066 e. 
• Correlations between heavy isotopes 
in irradiated fuels of light water 
power reactors. EUR 5071 e. 
• Centrale elettronucleare di Latina. 
Relazione annuale 1972. EUR 5073 
• Bestimmung des Dampfgehaltes und 
der Strömungsform eines Zweipha-
sengemisches in konzentrischen 
Ringspalten. EUR 5077 d. 
• SORA - Scientific-Experimental Pro-
gramme. EUR 5080 e. 
• Application of atomic energy in agri-
culture. Annual Report 1972. EUR 
5101 e. 
• Centrale Elettronucleare del Gari-
gliano. Relazione annuale 1972. EUR 
5104 i. 
• Über Messungen der gespeicherten 
Energie an kaltverformten polykri-
stallinen Cu-Proben. EUR 5106 d. 
• ISOTEX-1. Code de calcul de con-
centrations isotopiques et de rapports 
de concentrations. EUR 5111 f. 
• A digital system for speed and phase 
control of phased neutron chopper 
arrays. EUR 5112 e. 
• The CBNM satellite computer sys-
tem. Part I: The multiparameter sys-
tem user handbook. EUR 5113 e. 
• MOSIF - A data acquisition system 
for the study of solids motion in 
fluidized beds. EUR 5115 e. 
• The SLC-II system language transla-
tor package concepts and facilities. 
EUR 5116 e. 
• GRETEL, a computer program for 
gamma ray spectrometry with Ge 
(Li) detectors. EUR 5117 e. 
• Environmental radioactivity. Ispra 
1972. EUR 5118 e. 
• Bibliography on heat transport in 
nuclear fuels and related phenomena. 
EUR 5119 e. 
• Eine Neutronenquelle hoher Intensi-
tät mit definiertem Spektrum. EUR 
5120 d. 
• Interface zur Steuerung einer Multi-
chopperanlage. EUR 5121 d. 
• Fourth Symposium on microdosi-
metry. I. EUR 5122 d-e-f. 
• Fourth Symposium on microdosi-
metry. IL EUR 5122 d-e-f. 
• Thin layer and gas-chromatographic 
analysis of alveolar lipids in silicotic 
rats. EUR 5123 e. 
• Determination of mercury by con-
trolled potential coulometry: an out-
lay for automatic performance. EUR 
5125 e. 
• Etude expérimentale de l'effet de la 
courbure sur la valeur du facteur 
d'intensité de contrainte dans les 
coques cylindriques. EUR 5137 f. 
• Feasibility study of the use of radio-
active fission product correlations for 
the determination of burnup and 
heavy isotopes composition of BWR 
Dodewaard fuel. EUR 5141 e. 
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euro abstracts — Section II — COAL AND STEEL 
a new edition of euro abstracts 
Starting January 1975, the Commission of the European Communities 
will regularly publish a second section of "euro abstracts" devoted entirely to 
reseach under the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). 
The new section will be published by the Directorate-General for "Scientific 
and Technical Information and Information Management" in collaboration with 
the Directorates-General for "Industrial and Technological Affairs", "Social 
Affairs", and "Energy", and will be entitled "euro abstracts Coal and Steel". 
Information on research supported by the ECSC budget pursuant to Article 
55 of the Treaty of Paris will be arranged in four sections, as follows: 
— medium-term research programmes, one-year or six-monthly research progress; 
— research agreements; 
— final reports and other publications arising from research; 
— patents arising from research. 
Within each section the information will be listed under one of the following 
three headings: 
— technical research relating to coal; 
— technical research relating to steel; 
— social research (occupational hygiene, safety and medicine). 
The information will be published in three languages (English, French and 
German) in the form of summaries preceded where appropriate by bibliographical 
references. 
The Commission of the European Communities is convinced that this new 
section meets a real need and that "euro abstracts Coal and Steel" will arouse 
the interest of scientific and industrial circles by keeping them regularly informed 
of the progress of coal and steel research at Community level. 
"euro abstracts - section II - Coal and Steel" will be distributed free of 
charge in 1975. Requests should be directed to the 
Commission of the European Communities 
DG XIII - A 
29, rue Aldringen 
Luxembourg (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) 
OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Boîte postale 1003 — Luxembourg 6560(3) 
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